What I'm stuck on is what seems to be an
assumption in your argument that every question posed with respect
to interpreting interpreting a statute is a legal one.
I see Chevron as doing the very important work of
helping courts stay away from policy making.
And so I'd I'd like for you to sort of.
Think of it through that lens and help me understand
why if we do away with Chevron's framework.
We won't have a problem of courts actually making a
policy decision.
So Justice K and gave you a number of examples.
And I think the reason why those examples are hard
or why they're ambiguous or whatever is because at bottom
they're not asking legal questions,
they're asking policy questions. How is it that status,
you know, stationary source is to be defined?
That's not really a legal question.
I mean, there could be several reasonable ways of interpreting
that.
And at the end of the day,
I think the way I've been thinking about Chevron is
Congress has given that policy choice to the agency.
And my concern is that if we take away something
like Chevron,
the court will then suddenly become a policymaker by majority
rule or not making policy determination.
So how can we avoid that?